Asymmetric Value in Governance: Relational and Contractual Mechanisms for Buyer-Supplier Innovation.

This study investigates the asymmetric value of contractual and relational governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships (BSRs) for innovation. While extensive research examines governance in interorganizational relationships (IORs), the relative effectiveness of these mechanisms remains contested. Using data from the Italian automotive supply chain, we examine how these mechanisms foster innovation outcomes differently for buyers and suppliers. Our findings reveal thatthe effectiveness of governance mechanisms varies depending on the focal firm's role, with buyers benefiting more from relational governance and suppliers from contractual governance. Furthermore, relational governance negatively moderates the impact of contractual governance on suppliers, while contractual governance positively moderates the effect of relational governance on buyers. These findings underscore the need for context-specific governance strategies that address the distinct challenges and opportunities faced by buyers and suppliers in innovation partnerships.