We study the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the framework of a repeated economy. In each repetition agents observe the sequence of asymmetric REE's occurred in the past to update their private information. We show that, in the limit, agents reach a symmetric information REE which exists universally (and not generically) and it is Pareto efficient and obviously incentive compatible. We also prove the converse result, i.e., given a symmetric information REE, we can construct a sequence of approximate asymmetric REE allocations that converges to the symmetric information REE. In view of the above results, the symmetric information REE provides a rationalization for the asymmetric one.

On the limit points of an infinitely repeated rational expectations equilibrium

Urbinati, Niccolò
;
2024-01-01

Abstract

We study the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the framework of a repeated economy. In each repetition agents observe the sequence of asymmetric REE's occurred in the past to update their private information. We show that, in the limit, agents reach a symmetric information REE which exists universally (and not generically) and it is Pareto efficient and obviously incentive compatible. We also prove the converse result, i.e., given a symmetric information REE, we can construct a sequence of approximate asymmetric REE allocations that converges to the symmetric information REE. In view of the above results, the symmetric information REE provides a rationalization for the asymmetric one.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/5083402
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