Quantum Indeterminacy and the Double Slit Experiment

In Calosi and Wilson (2018), we argue that on many interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM), there is quantum mechanical indeterminacy (QMI), and that a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI), as per Wilson (2013) and (2016), properly accommodates the full range of cases of QMI. Here we argue that this approach is superior to other treatments of QMI on offer, both realistic and deflationary, in providing the basis for an intelligible explanation of the interference patterns in the double-slit experiment. We start with a brief overview of the motivations for QMI and for a determinable-based account of MI (Sect. 2). We then apply a developed ‘glutty’ implementation of determinable-based QMI to the superposition-based QMI present in the double-slit experiment, and positively compare the associated explanation of double-slit interference with that available on a metaphysical supervaluationist account of QMI (Sect. 3). We then present and respond to objections, due to Glick (2017) and Torza (2020), either to QMI (Sect. 4) or to our specific account of QMI (Sect. 5); in these sections we also positively compare our treatment of double-slit interference to that available on Glick’s deflationary treatment of QMI. We conclude with some dialectical observations (Sect. 6).