Model Checking Adaptive Service Compositions

We present a logic-based verification framework for multilevel security and transactional correctness of service oriented architectures. The framework is targeted at the analysis of data confidentiality, enforced by non-interference, and of service responsiveness, captured by a notion of compliance that implies deadlock and livelock freedom. We isolate a class of modal μ-calculus formulae, interpreted over service configurations, that characterise configurations satisfying the properties of interest. We then investigate an adaptation technique based on the use of coercion filters to block any action that might potentially break security or transactional correctness. Based on the above, we devise a model checking algorithm for adaptive service compositions which automatically synthesises the maximal (most expressive/permissive) filter enforcing the desired security and correctness properties.

We present a logic-based verification framework for multilevel security and transactional correctness of service oriented architectures. The framework is targeted at the analysis of data confidentiality, enforced by non-interference, and of service responsiveness, captured by a notion of compliance that implies dead lock and livelock freedom. We isolate a class of modalμ-calculus formulae, interpreted over service configurations, that characterise configurations satisfying the properties of interest. We then investigate an adaptation technique based on the use of coercion filters to block any action that might potentially break security or transactonal correctness. Based on the above, we devise a model checking algorithm for adaptive service compositions which automatically synthesises the maximal (mostexpressive/permissive) filter enforcing the desired security and correctness properties.