We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proo frule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
Triossi, Matteo
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2021-01-01
Abstract
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proo frule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Romero-Medina-Triossi2021_Article_Two-sidedStrategy-proofnessInM.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Versione dell'editore
Licenza:
Creative commons
Dimensione
351.29 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
351.29 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
