The category "organism" has an ambiguous status: is it scientific or is it philosophical? Or, if one looks at it from within the relatively recent field or sub-field of philosophy of biology, is it a central, or at least legitimate category therein, or should it be dispensed with? In any case, it has long served as a kind of scientific bolstering for a philosophical train of argument which seeks to refute the mechanistic or reductionist trend, which has been perceived as dominant since the 17th century, whether in the case of Stahlian animism, Leibnizian monadology, the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch, or, lastly, of the "phenomenology of organic life" in the 20th century, with authors such as Kurt Goldstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Georges Canguilhem. In this paper I try to reconstruct some of the main interpretive stages or layers of the concept of organism in order to evaluate it critically. How might organism be a useful concept if one rules out the excesses of organismic biology and metaphysics? Varieties of instrumentalism and what I call the projective concept of organism are appealing, but perhaps ultimately unsatisfying.
Wolfe, Charles T (Corresponding)
|Data di pubblicazione:||2010|
|Titolo:||Do organisms have an ontological status?|
|Rivista:||HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIFE SCIENCES|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||2.1 Articolo su rivista |