We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
Incentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities
Matteo Maria Triossi VerondiniWriting – Review & Editing
2019-01-01
Abstract
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
1-s2.0-S016517651930343X-main(2).pdf
non disponibili
Tipologia:
Versione dell'editore
Licenza:
Accesso chiuso-personale
Dimensione
280.67 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
280.67 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
