Revisiting Normativity for a Post-Cognitivist View of Linguistic Feeling

.This article reconsiders the role of affectivity in defining normativity in a situated sense. Traditional approaches have often construed language solely as a rule-governed system and cognition as a disembodied, mechanistic process. By contrast, we advance a view of language as a contextual and dynamical activity and situate cognition within affective life. Central to this reframing is the notion of linguistic feeling, understood as the affective attunement through which speakers experience and navigate norms. Rather than conceiving norms as only pertaining to convention and public criteria, we defend their function as conditions for rational experience: norms become intelligible through felt sensibilities of rightness, appropriateness, and variation. This approach overcomes internalist accounts that isolate linguistic intuitions from social and embodied contexts, showing instead how linguistic feeling is an affective manifestation of the same conceptual capacities that render us responsive to reasons. By integrating the affective and linguistic sciences, the philosophy of the space of reasons, and post-cognitivism, the paper offers a reconceptualization of normativity as rooted in sensibility. The conclusion highlights implications for linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science, urging a shift from formalist and conventionalist models toward approaches that acknowledge the constitutive role of affect in language and rationality.