Back to the Cold War era in-betweenness: Italy’s China strategy in the context of the Indo-Pacific framework

Over the past few years, Italy-China relations have been dominated by the debate over Italy’s first embracing and then leaving the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for which Italy was the only G7 country to join the China-led project and then the first and only country to leave it. A combination of diplomatic factors, including Rome’s alignment with the US and NATO in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war and the Italian presidency of the G7, has decisively contributed to reorienting Rome’s foreign policy and abandoning the controversial MoU with Beijing. Following the EU’s official approach to China, the government led by the far-right Brothers of Italy party has adopted a mixed approach towards Beijing. Therefore, its departure from the BRI has been accompanied by the promotion of the idea of a years-long strategic partnership between the two countries through a series of high-profile visits to Beijing, including those by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in July and President Sergio Mattarella in November 2024. Nonetheless, Italy’s pragmatic approach towards China is part of Rome’s wider repositioning within the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy framework. Interestingly, whilst Meloni was in Beijing, the Italian navy flagship Cavour aircraft carrier strike group was cruising towards the Pacific, via the Indian Ocean, for a series of port calls and joint exercises along with partners such as the USA, Japan and Australia. In light of the above, this paper argues that the recent development of Italy-China relations and Italy’s “partial” backing of the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy appears as a newly brushed Cold War era “in-betweenness”.