Ghosts in the Machine? Il dibattito esegetico sulla concezione aristotelica dei φαντάσματα

This article examines the exegetical debate on Aristotle’s conception of phantasmata and its implications for epistemological realism. The discussion centers on whether Aristotle’s realism is “direct”, where cognition engages with reality without intermediaries, or “representational”, where internal representations mediate cognition. It is argued that this discussion arises from and feeds on a “ghostly”, i.e. unspoken, assumption in the exegetical “machine” of Aristotle’s epistemological theory: the interpretation of the nature of phantasmata. Phantasmata, products of phantasia, are typically interpreted in three ways: (1) as internal representations, (2) as physiological processes, or (3) as psychophysical experiences. These three conceptions are discussed with reference to the positions of Victor Caston, Pavel Gregorić, Klaus Corcilius, and David Charles. The article ultimately argues that Aristotle’s phantasmata should be understood as permanent traces of past perceptual experiences. Rather than acting as intermediaries between us and the world, phantasmata retain a causal and structural link to the original perceptual experience. By taking into account the “relational” nature of perceptual experience, this analysis situates Aristotle’s theory as a nuanced alternative to both naïve realism and representationalism.