"There is Indeed the Inexpressible". Some Remarks on Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”

In this paper, I will analyse proposition 6.522 of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", which states that “[t]here is indeed the inexpressible” (TLP 6.522). My aim is to show that this proposition is closely related to much of what we read about ethics, aesthetics (and logic) and their connection in the "Tractatus". In particular, I will first point out that the problem of the inexpressible refers back to an issue that is central both in the "Tractatus" and in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, that is: the idea that the sense of a proposition is not “something” different and distinct from the proposition itself, just as the sense of life is not “something” different and distinct from life itself. In the last part of the paper, I will illustrate how this idea also underlies the way in which Wittgenstein addresses aesthetic matters and the distinction between world and facts of the world.