Metaphysics of primal facts vs. phenomenology as first philosophy?

According to László Tengelyi, Husserl’s so-called “metaphysics in a new sense” amounts to the investigation of primal (or originary) facts [“Urtatsachen”], and the fundamental character of this investigation results from the reversal of ontological priority between fact and essence that takes place at the level of transcendental facticity. As a consequence, according to Tengelyi, transcendental phenomenology loses its status of first philosophy. In my answer to Inga Römer, I will try to show that Tengelyi’s notion of a metaphysics of primal facts does not withstand a close scrutiny of the relevant texts, nor a systematic criticism based on Husserl’s notion of philosophy. Metaphysics as the result of the phenomenological transformation of the sciences into ultimate sciences of factual reality and what Husserl calls “metaphysics in a new sense” form part of a single endeavor grounded in phenomenology as first philosophy. Such endeavor consists in the attempt to understand first what de facto exists in its true being, and, thereafter, its sense for us. Finally, I will suggest that Römer’s claims about the limitations affecting Husserl’s notion of teleology can be vindicated on the basis of such conception of metaphysics.