Is there a Wittgensteinian Legacy on Habit?

The paper focuses on the connection between Wittgenstein’s “post-Tractarian” philosophy and contemporary debates on the nature of habitual behaviour and its alleged automaticity by looking at the problem of the normativity of habits and the role of custom in changing and preventing dysfunctional habits. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be an additional useful tool to engage in a re-consideration of habit as it has been advanced by the pragmatist tradition against an operational account. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein’s conceptualization of habit and custom can be used to address the dichotomy between habit and intelligence, and the dichotomy between habituation and control. Firstly, I present Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of custom as Gepflogenheit to undermine the former dichotomy. Secondly, I present Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of custom as habituation (Gewohnheit) and its relation to sensibility to undermine the latter dichotomy. Finally, I apply Wittgenstein’s insights to the issue of habit crisis and change through a comparison with Dewey’s account in his Human Nature and Conduct.