We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks and its implications for regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP—the government’s ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury—had a significant effect on bank behavior. Banks were averse to these appointments—the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury were associated with improved bank performance and lower CEO pay.

The Carrot and the Stick: Bank Bailouts and the Disciplining Role of Board Appointments

Pelizzon, Loriana
;
2024-01-01

Abstract

We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks and its implications for regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP—the government’s ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury—had a significant effect on bank behavior. Banks were averse to these appointments—the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury were associated with improved bank performance and lower CEO pay.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/5084769
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