Il confronto di Heidegger con la Retorica aristotelica e la questione dell’argomentazione

This paper clarifies the meaning of Heidegger’s argumentation on the basis of his original interpretation of Aristotelian rhetoric. Once it has been made clear that Heidegger does not renounce argumentation, it is shown how the impulse to rethink argumentation stems from his confrontation with the Rhetoric during the 1924 lecture (1). This confrontation is contextualised within the conceptual landscape of the 1920s (formal indication, evidence, perception), where Aristotle plays a crucial role in Heidegger's journey from Husserl to Kant (2). The main section (3) shows how at the centre of this conceptual network is the phenomenon of diathesis, which links the theme of the perception of possibility to that of affection. It is precisely affective openness to the world that exerts the constraint on existence from which argumentation derives its cogency.