By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election win- ner, we identify a positive effect of council size on party cohesion. We propose the following mechanism: if a more diverse set of candidates is electorally appealing but less efficient in serving policy-related goals, parties face weaker incentives to maintain cohesion in institutional settings, such as smaller councils, which reward higher vote shares more generously.

Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

Troumpounis, Orestis;
2024-01-01

Abstract

By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election win- ner, we identify a positive effect of council size on party cohesion. We propose the following mechanism: if a more diverse set of candidates is electorally appealing but less efficient in serving policy-related goals, parties face weaker incentives to maintain cohesion in institutional settings, such as smaller councils, which reward higher vote shares more generously.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/5083089
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