How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.
Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization
Troumpounis, Orestis;
2019-01-01
Abstract
How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
JPUBE.pdf
non disponibili
Tipologia:
Versione dell'editore
Licenza:
Accesso chiuso-personale
Dimensione
834.43 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
834.43 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
