Mapping the Boundaries of Conscious Life in Margaret Cavendish's Philosophy

In this paper I investigate where the boundaries of conscious mental life lie in Cavendish’s theory, and why. Cavendish argues for a wholly material yet wholly thinking universe. She claims that all matter is capable of 'self-knowledge' and 'perception', so that every part of nature 'must have its own knowledge and perception, according to its own particular nature'. It is unclear, however, whether the universal capacity of matter to know and perceive also implies the presence of consciousness. I show that Cavendish’s use of the notions of 'self-knowledge' and 'perception' implies the attribution of consciousness to all bodies. I identify one condition under which the ubiquitous presence of consciousness is intuitively required in Cavendish’s system: namely the presence of intentional agency in every part of nature, which Cavendish conceives as necessary, alongside the capacity of self-motion, to account for the orderly behavior of any body.