In the wake of financial scandals involving some major companies listed on the Italian stock exchange, the Italian legal system has introduced enhanced tools for internal controls through the formation of committees that will handle related-party transactions. In this context, the role of independent directors appointed to oversee: (a) the “substantial and formal correctness” of related-party transactions; and (b) the best interests of the company, has become crucial. This article explores light and shadow of the efficiency of this legal institution on which the Italian legislature has placed its expectations, despite the fact that the fragility of this institution has already been highlighted in connection with other laws that have imple mented a similar framework.
GLI AMMINISTRATORI INDIPENDENTI NEL COMITATO PARTI CORRELATE
MICHIELI N
2014-01-01
Abstract
In the wake of financial scandals involving some major companies listed on the Italian stock exchange, the Italian legal system has introduced enhanced tools for internal controls through the formation of committees that will handle related-party transactions. In this context, the role of independent directors appointed to oversee: (a) the “substantial and formal correctness” of related-party transactions; and (b) the best interests of the company, has become crucial. This article explores light and shadow of the efficiency of this legal institution on which the Italian legislature has placed its expectations, despite the fact that the fragility of this institution has already been highlighted in connection with other laws that have imple mented a similar framework.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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