The Multilocation Trilemma

The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location— is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location— in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called ‘functionality’, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for (1) the location of immanent universals, (2) the multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects, (3) the multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and that it (4) makes extended simples impossible