«Deo mens nostra subdenda est». Note sul sapere dimostrativo e i suoi limiti nelle Quaestiones de fide et de cognitione di Matteo d’Acquasparta

The article aims to analyse Matthew of Acquasparta’s thought concerning the insufficiency of demonstrative knowledge for grasping the truth and understanding the origin and purpose of human existence. After a brief discussion on the concept of scientia and the epistemological status of theology in the second half of the 13th century, the article shows that Matthew proposes a broad concept of scientia which includes non-demonstrative knowledge of first principles, sensitive knowledge of physical reality, and faith understood both as a fiduciary disposition towards others in everyday life and as a theological virtue. Matthew’s aim is also to show that Augustine and Aristotle are, after all, agreed about the insufficiency of demonstrative knowledge. For this reason, Matthew’s Augustinism cannot be understood as a prejudicial form of anti-Aristotelianism, but rather as a positive interpretation of Aristotle’s thought in defence of the rationality of Christian faith.