Our study investigates a model of general equilibrium banking that incorporates moral hazard and incentive mechanisms for bank risk-taking, with a particular focus on deposit market competition. Our findings reveal that when banks compete perfectly in the deposit market, it leads to maximal welfare and an optimal level of bank failure risk. This outcome remains valid even if the risk of failure for competitive banks is higher than that of banks with monopoly rents, and it is not affected by social costs associated with bank failures. Our model suggests that there is no trade-off between bank competition and financial stability. Our results support the empirical findings of Carlson, Correia, and Luck (2022).
WELFARE AND BANK RISK-TAKING
Marcella Lucchetta
2024-01-01
Abstract
Our study investigates a model of general equilibrium banking that incorporates moral hazard and incentive mechanisms for bank risk-taking, with a particular focus on deposit market competition. Our findings reveal that when banks compete perfectly in the deposit market, it leads to maximal welfare and an optimal level of bank failure risk. This outcome remains valid even if the risk of failure for competitive banks is higher than that of banks with monopoly rents, and it is not affected by social costs associated with bank failures. Our model suggests that there is no trade-off between bank competition and financial stability. Our results support the empirical findings of Carlson, Correia, and Luck (2022).File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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