We study the Tullock contest model with desert concerns (Gill and Stone, 2010). In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish the conditions necessary for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of desert concerns on players’ spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.
Tullock Contest with Desert Concerns
Francesco Trevisan
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2023-01-01
Abstract
We study the Tullock contest model with desert concerns (Gill and Stone, 2010). In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish the conditions necessary for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of desert concerns on players’ spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.
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