We study the Tullock contest model with desert concerns (Gill and Stone, 2010). In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish the conditions necessary for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of desert concerns on players’ spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.
Tullock Contests with reference-dependent preferences
Francesco Trevisan
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2023-01-01
Abstract
We study the Tullock contest model with desert concerns (Gill and Stone, 2010). In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players and convex effort costs, we establish the conditions necessary for a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of desert concerns on players’ spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.
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