An epistemology of noise

Malaspina’s An Epistemology of Noise is a philosophical discussion of the concept of noise, illuminating both its preconditions and its far-reaching im- plications. In a literal sense, “noise” describes possible forms of human percep- tion related to aesthetics, acoustics, and audiometry. Figuratively, noise con- notes a range of negative qualities associated with disturbance, disruption, or perturbation. After we recognize that noise, especially in its aesthetic or com- monsense usage, is defined relationally, and occupies the negative position in a dichotomy with sound, we might ask: is there anything more to know to about noise? An Epistemology of Noise proves that there is. Considering noise an epis- temological problem as Malaspina does, its structural relevance for the theory of knowledge becomes clear. Indeed, Malaspina shows that noise allows us to address the epistemological question “how does knowledge constitute itself in the face of contingency”? and its flip-side “what role does uncertainty play in the constitution of knowledge”? (39) In this respect, the potential of the notion of noise has been largely neglected and is therefore still unexplored.