he essay opens with a brief reconstruction of the way the mind-body problem has been understood and approached in modern thought and, in particular, in the context of Cartesian dualism. The so-called «dissolutionist» approach is then introduced, exemplified with the very different philosophical positions of Ryle and Heidegger. The central part of the essay is devoted to a discussion of the way in which Wittgenstein tried to show that at the basis of many doctrines developed as an answer to the mind-body problem (in particular, dualism and behaviourism) lie what he calls «grammatical fictions».
The Mind-Body Problem and Wittgenstein’s Method
Perissinotto, Luigi
2022-01-01
Abstract
he essay opens with a brief reconstruction of the way the mind-body problem has been understood and approached in modern thought and, in particular, in the context of Cartesian dualism. The so-called «dissolutionist» approach is then introduced, exemplified with the very different philosophical positions of Ryle and Heidegger. The central part of the essay is devoted to a discussion of the way in which Wittgenstein tried to show that at the basis of many doctrines developed as an answer to the mind-body problem (in particular, dualism and behaviourism) lie what he calls «grammatical fictions».
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