There are many authors who consider the so-called "moral nose" a valid tool of knowledge in the field of morality. The term moral nose was used by George Orwell, following in Friedrich Nietzsche footsteps and was described very well by Leo Tolstoy. It has also been relied on by authors such as Elisabeth Anscombe, Bernard Williams, Noam Chomsky, Stuart Hampshire, Mary Warnock and Leon Kass. This article examines John Harris precise criticism of what he ironically calls the olfactory school of moral philosophy; Harris criticism is contrasted with Jonathan Glover's defense of the moral nose. Glover, in fact, proposes useful distinctions between the various meanings that the notion of moral nose can assume. Finally, the notion of moral nose is compared with that of other classical notions, such as the Aristotelian phronesis, the Heideggerian notion of aletheia and the concept of sentiment proposed by the philosopher Thomas Reid. The conclusion is that morality cannot be based only on reason, nor on feeling alone (as David Hume thinks).

On Moral Nose

Turoldo F.
In corso di stampa

Abstract

There are many authors who consider the so-called "moral nose" a valid tool of knowledge in the field of morality. The term moral nose was used by George Orwell, following in Friedrich Nietzsche footsteps and was described very well by Leo Tolstoy. It has also been relied on by authors such as Elisabeth Anscombe, Bernard Williams, Noam Chomsky, Stuart Hampshire, Mary Warnock and Leon Kass. This article examines John Harris precise criticism of what he ironically calls the olfactory school of moral philosophy; Harris criticism is contrasted with Jonathan Glover's defense of the moral nose. Glover, in fact, proposes useful distinctions between the various meanings that the notion of moral nose can assume. Finally, the notion of moral nose is compared with that of other classical notions, such as the Aristotelian phronesis, the Heideggerian notion of aletheia and the concept of sentiment proposed by the philosopher Thomas Reid. The conclusion is that morality cannot be based only on reason, nor on feeling alone (as David Hume thinks).
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10278/5002772
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact