How to do different things with words: why Dewey's aesthetics is peculiar

In this paper I am going to argue that Dewey's approach to aesthetics can exert a peculiarly 'refreshing' effect on the traditional analytical debate in the philosophy of art. Furthermore it presents some advantages compared to the deeply critical continental approaches toward aesthetic productions. The thesis of the paper will be articulated through a brief inquiry into three strictly related concepts that shape Dewey's distinctive point of view – that is “aesthetic experience”, “aesthetic quality” and “consummation”. The first concept appears far removed from both traditional continental pursuits of aesthetic autonomy and unsuccessful analytical attempts to define art, while serving – broadly speaking – ethical or political goals. The second concept is based on the recognition that qualitative aspects are basically part of our common experiences, that they are modes of meaning of our environment and cannot be reduced to subjective phenomena or be restricted within special compartments. The third concept concerns the consummatory phase of our experiencing and the basic anthropological need to enjoy what we are doing and the way we are doing it, in contrast to a certain ascetic trend in continental aesthetics.