From the Atoms to the Self

The volume by A. Németh [N.], Epicurus on the Self, in Issues in Ancient Philosophy (Routledge, London-New York 2017), devoted to Book 25 of Epicurus’ On Nature, represents an important contribution to the exact definition of the problem investigated by Epicurus in this treatise. The main aim of the book is to examine the relation between Epicurus’ conception of the psychological development of living beings and his ethical theory. N.’s book addresses the question from a particular perspective, that of the formation of the self. In particular, his analysis aims to illustrate how Epicurus succeeds in outlining a notion of self-awareness within the framework of his atomism which is capable of justifying his eudaimonism and ethical pragmatism. In this article I will focus on the main thesis endorsed by the author concerning Epicurus’ notion of Self, the type of Epicurus’ physicalism, and the function of the swerve in Epicurus’ psychology. The purpose of my essay is to highlight the most relevant and original contribution made by N.’s study, while at the same time offering an alter- native interpretation of certain passages from Book 25 of On Nature which he examines, as well as of certain aspects of Epicurean physicalism and of the context in which the philosopher developed his theory.