The Shadow of Cold War over Latin America. The US Reaction to Fidel Castro’s Nationalism, 1956-1959

Scholars have addressed the problem of the Dwight Eisenhower administration’s opposition to Fidel Castro’s nationalist insurrection (1956–59) following two main perspectives. Some authors have perceived it in terms of a response to the threat that Castro’s radical programme posed to American economic interests in Cuba. Other scholars have claimed that, in the 1950s, Washington did not have a clear perception of the differences between progressive nationalism and communism. This article offers a different explanation. It argues that the intersection between the Cold War and the decolonisation process played a crucial role in changing the US’s perception of Latin American nationalism. Specifically, the launch of the Peaceful Coexistence strategy by the Soviet post-Stalinist leadership increased Moscow’s ability to interact with nationalism of developing areas, pushing the Republican administration into a defensive position in the Third World. During the 1950s, this context strongly influenced Washington’s diplomatic strategy in the Latin American and the Cuban scenarios, driving the Eisenhower Presidency to adopt a hostile position toward nationalist governments or nationalist inspired political movements such as Castro’s.