Several “value-like” solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference between these values is caused by how payoff strategic possibilities of coalitions of the game are handled.
A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information
Salamanca, Andrés
2019-01-01
Abstract
Several “value-like” solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference between these values is caused by how payoff strategic possibilities of coalitions of the game are handled.
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