Several “value-like” solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference between these values is caused by how payoff strategic possibilities of coalitions of the game are handled.

A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information

Salamanca, Andrés
2019

Abstract

Several “value-like” solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference between these values is caused by how payoff strategic possibilities of coalitions of the game are handled.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10278/3743673
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