Henry of Ghent : the Problem of Individuation and the Contingency of Creatures. Some Remarks on Question 8 of Quodlibet II

This paper examines Henry of Ghent's account of individuation. Through the analysis of question 8 of Quodlibet II and other textual sources, the paper studies the connection between the theme of the individuation and that of the contingency of creatures. In particular, it will investigate Henry's criticism of the so-called Aristotelian thesis, supported by Thomas Aquinas, according to which matter is the one and only principle of individuation. According to this thesis, in the case of angels, since they are devoid of matter, there are no multiple individuals in the same species, but rather species that are in themselves individual. For Henry, this statement entails that angels are necessary and divine beings. Differently from other scholars, we will show that Henry's critical remarks concerning the connection between singularity and the divine nature of the angelic essences is grounded on the assumption that what multiplies an essence into many individual supposits is, in fact, subsistence, i.e. individual existence. In other words, Henry's criticism of Thomas Aquinas presupposes the thesis that subsistence is the proper cause of the individuation of an essence.