Contrary to what happens in Descartes’s philosophy, self-knowledge is problematic in Spinoza. The knowledge of one’s mind, in fact, is only that involved in the perception of the affections of one’s body. This thesis makes difficult to develop a satisfactory theory of pride which, according to Spinoza, implies a knowledge of the self as the cause of the joy caused in others. This difficulty was absent in the philosophy of Descartes. This difficulty is presented in the same terms in the philosophy of David Hume, and emerges in the discus- sion of the passion of pride. Both authors are united by the refusal of the Cartesian thesis of privileged access to the nature of their mind.
The Passions of the Self. From Descartes to Hume through Spinoza
Emanuela Scribano
2020-01-01
Abstract
Contrary to what happens in Descartes’s philosophy, self-knowledge is problematic in Spinoza. The knowledge of one’s mind, in fact, is only that involved in the perception of the affections of one’s body. This thesis makes difficult to develop a satisfactory theory of pride which, according to Spinoza, implies a knowledge of the self as the cause of the joy caused in others. This difficulty was absent in the philosophy of Descartes. This difficulty is presented in the same terms in the philosophy of David Hume, and emerges in the discus- sion of the passion of pride. Both authors are united by the refusal of the Cartesian thesis of privileged access to the nature of their mind.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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