We show that repurchase agreements (repos) arise as the instrument of choice to borrow in a competitive model with limited commitment. The repo contract traded in equilibrium provides insurance against fluctuations in the asset price in states where collateral value is high and maximizes borrowing capacity when it is low. Haircuts increase both with counterparty risk and asset risk. In equilibrium, lenders choose to re-use collateral. This increases the circulation of the asset and generates a “collateral multiplier” effect. Finally, we show that intermediation by dealers may endogenously arise in equilibrium, with chains of repos among traders.
|Data di pubblicazione:||2019|
|Titolo:||A theory of repurchase agreements, collateral re-use, and repo intermediation|
|Rivista:||REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2019.04.009|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||2.1 Articolo su rivista |
File in questo prodotto:
|GMM_Feb19_Rev2.pdf||Documento in Post-print||Accesso gratuito (solo visione)||Open Access dal 30/01/2023|