ARCA è l'archivio istituzionale ad accesso aperto della ricerca dell'Università Ca' Foscari Venezia e nasce nel 2014 con lo scopo di raccogliere, diffondere e conservare la produzione scientifica dell'Università. Costituisce di fatto il catalogo della ricerca di Ateneo.
ARCA è un sistema Open Access: è non solo consultabile da tutti e visibile nei motori di ricerca, ma anche interoperabile con il portale cerCa. In questo modo vengono valorizzate la produzione scientifica dell'Ateneo e la visibilità dei ricercatori.

We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-region setup. To counteract the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when players are free to choose where to harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the equilibria in the case of a common resource with those that emerge when the regulator either creates a natural reserve, or assigns Territorial User Rights to the players. We show that, when technological and preference parameters dictate a low harvesting effort, the policies are ineffective in promoting the conservation of the resource and, in addition, they lead to a lower payoff for at least one of the players. Conversely, in a context of higher harvesting effort, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing extinction while also improving the welfare of both players.

We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-region setup.To counteract the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when players are free to choose where to harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the equilibria in the case of a common resource with those that emerge when the regulator either creates a natural reserve, or assigns Territorial User Rights to the players.We show that, when technological and preference parameters dictate a low harvesting effort, the policies are ineffective in promoting the conservation of the resource and, in addition, they lead to a lower payoff for at least one of the players. Conversely, in a context of higher harvesting effort, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing extinction while also improving the welfare of both players. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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