We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-region setup. To counteract the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when players are free to choose where to harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the equilibria in the case of a common resource with those that emerge when the regulator either creates a natural reserve, or assigns Territorial User Rights to the players. We show that, when technological and preference parameters dictate a low harvesting effort, the policies are ineffective in promoting the conservation of the resource and, in addition, they lead to a lower payoff for at least one of the players. Conversely, in a context of higher harvesting effort, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing extinction while also improving the welfare of both players.
We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-region setup.To counteract the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when players are free to choose where to harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the equilibria in the case of a common resource with those that emerge when the regulator either creates a natural reserve, or assigns Territorial User Rights to the players.We show that, when technological and preference parameters dictate a low harvesting effort, the policies are ineffective in promoting the conservation of the resource and, in addition, they lead to a lower payoff for at least one of the players. Conversely, in a context of higher harvesting effort, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing extinction while also improving the welfare of both players. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2019 |
Titolo: | Policy effectiveness in spatial resource wars: a two-region model |
Rivista: | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103818 |
Volume: | 111 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 2.1 Articolo su rivista |
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FabbriFaggianFreni-secondrevision.pdf | Ultima versione dell'articolo inviata per revisione all'editor. Mancante delle ultime (minori) correzioni. | Documento in Pre-print | Accesso chiuso-personale | Open Access dal 01/02/2022 |
1-s2.0-S0165176516305316-main.pdf | Versione dell'editore | Accesso chiuso-personale | Riservato |