We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
On the optimality of not allocating
Michelucci F.
2014-01-01
Abstract
We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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