We introduce two pieces of information (memes) into a diffusion process in which memes are transmitted when agents meet and forgotten at an exogenous rate. At most one meme can be transmitted at each meeting, which one depends on preferences over memes. We find that the conditions under which a unique meme becomes endemic are sufficient for both to become endemic. Segregation according to information preferences leads to polarization, i.e., nobody is informed of both memes, and a loss of information. We show how the likelihood of segregation depends on information preferences and on parameters of the diffusion process.
TABASSO, NICOLE (Corresponding)
|Data di pubblicazione:||2019|
|Titolo:||Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation|
|Rivista:||GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.003|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||2.1 Articolo su rivista |