Is Defactoism a Kind of Naturalism?

This paper focuses on Fogelin’s defactoist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, as it is found in Taking Wittgenstein at his word (Fogelin 2009). Fogelin explicitly states that defactoism must be distinguished from other labels. However, his defactoist reading seems reasonably akin to a naturalistic reading. This paper argues that defactoism might be considered a form of liberal naturalism and that the notion of liberal naturalism fits best with Wittgenstein’s overall later philosophy. It will be shown that, although defactoism clearly accounts for Wittgenstein’s peculiar treatment of traditional philosophical problems, it does not include important aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, such as the morphological method and the relevance of imaginary cases as a non-metaphysical form of estrangement.