We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.

Incentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities

Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2019

Abstract

We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
SSRN-id3405698.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print
Licenza: Dominio pubblico
Dimensione 248.01 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
248.01 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3716085
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact