We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
Titolo: | Incentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2019 | |
Serie: | ||
Abstract: | We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium. | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3716085 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 7.01 Working paper |
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