We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
Incentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities
Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2019-01-01
Abstract
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
SSRN-id3405698.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Documento in Pre-print
Licenza:
Dominio pubblico
Dimensione
248.01 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
248.01 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
