The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elections under qualified majority rules. It shows show that, even when the Condorcet Jury Theorem does not hold, there still can be meaningful information aggregation. In particular, we study the case of information aggregation under rational ignorance and with poorly informed voters.
Titolo: | Assessing the Extent of Democratic Failures: A 99%-Condorcet 's Jury Theorem |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2016 |
Serie: | |
Abstract: | The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elections under qualified majority rules. It shows show that, even when the Condorcet Jury Theorem does not hold, there still can be meaningful information aggregation. In particular, we study the case of information aggregation under rational ignorance and with poorly informed voters. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3716084 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 7.01 Working paper |
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