In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation.
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2011 | |
Titolo: | Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent | |
Rivista: | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9 | |
Volume: | 36 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 2.1 Articolo su rivista |
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