This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation. Inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens, a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government.
Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
Triossi M.
Writing – Review & Editing
2013-01-01
Abstract
This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation. Inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens, a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government.
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