We analyze the design of a unique Spanish public program aimed at recruiting high-quality researchers in public research centers: the Ramón y Cajal Program. We claim that, after a number of calls for applicants, the program design changed in response to agents' needs. Exploiting data on applications and candidates, we find that the new program design led to significant changes in the probability of being awarded a contract. In particular, opportunities for candidates with no attachment to the system were equalized.
Autori: | Triossi M. [Writing – Review & Editing] | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2013 | |
Titolo: | Boosting scientific research: Evidence from a public program | |
Rivista: | REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA APLICADA | |
Volume: | 21 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 2.1 Articolo su rivista |
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pubb3__Triossi_Verondini_Matteo_Maria.pdf | Versione dell'editore | Accesso chiuso-personale | Riservato |
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