We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.
Strategy-proof and group strategy-proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
Triossi M.
Writing – Review & Editing
2020
Abstract
We prove that group strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation problems with multi-unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.
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