Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules. We then introduce generalized games of manipulation in which hospitals move first and state their capacities, and interns are subsequently assigned to hospitals using a sequential mechanism. In this setting, we first consider stable revelation mechanisms and introduce conditions guaranteeing the stability of the outcome. Next, we prove that every stable non-revelation mechanism leads to unstable allocations, unless restrictions on the preferences of the agents are introduced.

Games with capacity manipulation: Incentives and Nash equilibria

TRIOSSI VERONDINI, Matteo Maria
Writing – Review & Editing
2013

Abstract

Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules. We then introduce generalized games of manipulation in which hospitals move first and state their capacities, and interns are subsequently assigned to hospitals using a sequential mechanism. In this setting, we first consider stable revelation mechanisms and introduce conditions guaranteeing the stability of the outcome. Next, we prove that every stable non-revelation mechanism leads to unstable allocations, unless restrictions on the preferences of the agents are introduced.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3715948
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