What is the emergent long-run equilibrium of a society, where many interacting agents beton the optimal energy to put in place in order toclimb on the Bandwagon? In this paper,we study the collective behavior of a large population of agents being either Left or Right:The core idea is that agents benefit from being with the winner party, but, on the otherhand, they suffer a cost in changing their status quo. At the microscopic level, the modelis formulated as a stochastic, symmetric dynamic game withNplayers. In the macroscopiclimit as N goes to infinity, the model can be rephrased as amean field game, whose equilibriadescribe the “rational” collective behavior of the society. It is of particular interest to detectthe emerging long time attractors, e.g., consensus or oscillating behavior. Significantly, wediscover thatbandwagoningcan be persistent at the macrolevel: We provide evidence, alsoon the basis of numerical simulations, of endogenously generated periodicity.
What is the emergent long-run equilibrium of a society, where many interacting agents bet on the optimal energy to put in place in order to climb on the Bandwagon? In this paper, we study the collective behavior of a large population of agents being either Left or Right: The core idea is that agents benefit from being with the winner party, but, on the other hand, they suffer a cost in changing their status quo. At the microscopic level, the model is formulated as a stochastic, symmetric dynamic game with N players. In the macroscopic limit as N → +∞, the model can be rephrased as a mean field game, whose equilibria describe the “rational” collective behavior of the society. It is of particular interest to detect the emerging long time attractors, e.g., consensus or oscillating behavior. Significantly, we discover that bandwagoning can be persistent at the macrolevel: We provide evidence, also on the basis of numerical simulations, of endogenously generated periodicity.
Climb on the bandwagon: consensus and periodicity in a lifetime utility model with strategic interactions
Sartori, Elena;Tolotti, Marco
2019-01-01
Abstract
What is the emergent long-run equilibrium of a society, where many interacting agents bet on the optimal energy to put in place in order to climb on the Bandwagon? In this paper, we study the collective behavior of a large population of agents being either Left or Right: The core idea is that agents benefit from being with the winner party, but, on the other hand, they suffer a cost in changing their status quo. At the microscopic level, the model is formulated as a stochastic, symmetric dynamic game with N players. In the macroscopic limit as N → +∞, the model can be rephrased as a mean field game, whose equilibria describe the “rational” collective behavior of the society. It is of particular interest to detect the emerging long time attractors, e.g., consensus or oscillating behavior. Significantly, we discover that bandwagoning can be persistent at the macrolevel: We provide evidence, also on the basis of numerical simulations, of endogenously generated periodicity.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
[38] DaiPra2019_Bandwagon_DynamicGames.pdf
non disponibili
Tipologia:
Documento in Post-print
Licenza:
Accesso chiuso-personale
Dimensione
609.23 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
609.23 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in ARCA sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.