In this paper we study the optimal conversion policy set by a society composed of a sequence of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations. We show that society can be equivalently viewed as a sequence of hyperbolic discounting agents. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution to an intergenerational non-cooperative dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible conversion. We show that under both naive and sophisticated beliefs about future time-inconsistency, the option value attached to the conversion decision is eroded and earlier conversion occurs. This determines a drastic bias toward the current generation gratification, which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from deforestation. (C) 2012 Department of Forest Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Umea. Published by Elsevier GmbH. All rights reserved.
|Data di pubblicazione:||2012|
|Titolo:||Optimal conservation policy under imperfect intergenerational altruism|
|Rivista:||JOURNAL OF FOREST ECONOMICS|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfe.2012.02.002|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||2.1 Articolo su rivista |