We investigate how oil dependence affects the trade of weapons between countries. We argue that oil-dependent economies have incentives to transfer arms to oil-rich countries to reduce their risk of instability and, as a result, the chances of disruption in the oil industry. We employ gravity models of the arms trade and estimate the effect of both a local as well as a global oil dependence. Two key results emerge. First, the volume of arms transfers to a specific country is affected by the degree of dependence on its supply of oil. Second, global oil dependence motivates arms export to oil-rich countries even in absence of a direct bilateral oil-for-weapons exchange. Our results point consistently toward the conclusion that the arms trade is an effective foreign policy tool to securing and maintaining access to oil. (JEL F10, F50, H56, Q34).
|Titolo:||Global arms trade and oil dependence∗|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2018|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||2.1 Articolo su rivista |