We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability-based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers’ individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.
The probability to reach an agreement as a foundation for axiomatic bargaining
MARCO LI CALZI
;LORENZO BASTIANELLO
2019-01-01
Abstract
We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability-based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers’ individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.
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