We study optimal dynamic compliance decisions in an uncertain environment. Contrary to the static literature, greater uncertainty affects consumption, not the optimal tax evasion rule. Thus, audit and sanctions rather than fiscal uncertainty should be used to control tax evasion.
Tax evasion and uncertainty in a dynamic context
BERNASCONI, Michele;
2015-01-01
Abstract
We study optimal dynamic compliance decisions in an uncertain environment. Contrary to the static literature, greater uncertainty affects consumption, not the optimal tax evasion rule. Thus, audit and sanctions rather than fiscal uncertainty should be used to control tax evasion.
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