People can reason about the preferences of other agents, and predict their behavior based on these preferences. Surprisingly, the psychology of reasoning has long negleded this fact, and focused instead on disinterested inferences, of which preferences are neither am imput nor an imput. this exclusive focus is untenable, though, as the expense of logic when logic and preferences point to different conclusions.
The psychology of reasoning about preferences and unconsequential decisions
LEGRENZI, Paolo
2012-01-01
Abstract
People can reason about the preferences of other agents, and predict their behavior based on these preferences. Surprisingly, the psychology of reasoning has long negleded this fact, and focused instead on disinterested inferences, of which preferences are neither am imput nor an imput. this exclusive focus is untenable, though, as the expense of logic when logic and preferences point to different conclusions.
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